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AN  OPTION VALUE ANALYSIS 
ABSTRACT 
The option value model developed in an  earlier paper is used  to simulate 
the effect on  retirement of  changes in a firm's pension plan compared to  the 
effect of  changes in  Social Security provisions.  The provisions of  the firm's 
pension plan have a much greater effect than Social Security regulations on 
the retirement decisions of  the firm's employees.  The analysis supports the 
following conclusions: 
•  Increasing the firm's early retirement age from 55 to 60, for example, 
would reduce by  almost 40  percent, from .48  to .30,  the fraction of 
employees that is retired by  age 60. 
•  The effect of  changes in Social Security rules, on  the other hand, 
would be small.  Raising the Social Security retirement ages by  one 
year, for example, has very  little effect on employee retirement rates. 
The proportion retired by  age 62 is reduced by only about 4 percent. 
•  Changes in  Social Security provisions that would otherwise encourage 
workers to continue workfng can easily be offset by  countervailing 
changes in  the provisions of  the firm's pension plan.  Firm responses, 
like delaying the Social Security offset to correspond to  m later 
Social Security retirement age, may simply be m logical revision of 
current firm plan  provisions. 
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The labor force participation rates  of older workers have declined 
dramatically in recent years.  The data for men show the  trend: 
Age  Q4 
1971  92.8  88.8  74.1  25.5 
1986  88.9  79.0  54.9  17.5 
A great deal of  analysis  has emphasized the role of Social Security  provisions 
in encouraging earlier retirement.  Recent  examples are Blinder, Gordon and 
Wise [1980],  Burkhauser [1980],  Hurd and Boskin [1981],  Gustman  and Steiriiseier 
[1986],  Burtless  and Moffitt [1984] ,  ?,urtless  [1986]  Hausman and Wise [1985]. 
Several of these papers direct  attention to the large increases in  Social 
Security benefits in the early  l97Os.  These papers for the most part show 
only a modest effect of these increases  on labor force participation rates; 
Flurd and Boskin [1984]  is an  exception. 
Largely ignored have been firm pension  plans.  Firm pension plans were 
introduced rapidly beginning In the  1950s.  Now about 50 percent of  employees 
are covered by  firm plans.  The proportion of  retiring  workers that  is covered 
by  a firm pension is still rising rapidly.  It increased from about 4 to 25 
percent between 1950 and 1980 and is still  rising rapidly.  About 75 percent 
of  covered employees have defined benefit plans.  The benefit  under such a 
plan is the promise by  the  employer to  pay the worker a specified amount at 
retirement.  The amount is typically determined  by  final salary and years of (2) 
firm employment.  Bulow [1981]  described pension  wealth accrual under rhese 
plans and Lazear [1983]  emphasized the porential role of plan provisions in 
inducing  early rerirement,  as a suhsriture for mandatory rerirement.  The very 
substanrial incentive  effects of these plans have been emphasized most 
recently by Kotlikoff and Wise [1985,  1987,  1988],  who summarize the 
incentives of approximately 2500 plans covered  by  the Bureau of  Labor 
Statistics Level of  Benefits Survey,  and  consider in great detail the effects 
of the provisions of  a large Fortune 500 firm.  This work demonstrates that 
the typical firm plan provides a large reward for remaining  with the  firm 
until some age, often the early retirement  age,  and then a substantial 
inducement  to leave the firm,  often as early as 55.  Almost all plans 
incorporate  a large penalty for working  past age 65.  The gain in wage 
earnings from working an  additional year is often offset in large part by  a 
loss in the present  value of  future  pension  benefits. 
There has been very little analysis  of  the  actual  effects of  these 
incentives on retirement,  however.  Exceptions  are Burkhauser [1979],  Fields 
and  Mitchell [1982],  Lazear [1983],  Kotlikoff and  Wise [1987],  and Hogarth 
[1988].  One reason  for the limited  attention  has been the absence  of 
appropriate data.  The analysis in this paper is based on the personnel 
records of a large Fortune 500 firm.  The firm pension plan was described in 
detail by  Kotlikoff and Wise [1987],  who also related the plan provisions to 
departure rates from the firm. 
The goal of  this paper is to quantify the effects of pension plan 
provisions on  departure rates from the firm and,  in  particular, to demonstrate 
the effect of potential changes in plan provisions.  A  particularly important 
component of  the analysis is to demonstrate  the relative effects of changes in (3) 
Social Security  versus firm pension plan provisions,  The analysis is based on 
the "option  value" model developed in Stock and Wise [1988]. 
The primary conclusions  are that: 
•  Firm plans have a much greater  effect than Social Security 
provisions on employee retirement decisions. 
•  Increasing the firm early retirement age from 55 to 60,  for 
example,  wo1.d reduce  by almost 40 percent the proportion of 
employees  who retire from the firm before age 60. 
•  The effect of  changea in Social  Security  provisions that are 
intended to prolong the labor force participation of the elderly, 
like the planned increase in the retirement age, may be  offset by 
the  response  of  firms to the change. 
We  begin in section I with a  description of  the incentive effects faced 
by workers in the firm.  The description of  the  incentive effects is also used 
to motivate our method of analysis.  The option value model is summarized in 
section II.  Parameter estimates are presented in section III and the model 
fir is emphasized.  It is shown that the model capturea extremely well the 
several  discontinuous jumps in firm departure rates caused by  pension plan and 
Social  Security provisions.  An  out of sample test of  the predictive validity 
of the model is also presented.  Simulations of  the effect on  departure rares 
of changes in fitm pension plan and in Social  Security provisions ate 
discussed in section IV.  A suzmsary and concluding  discussion is in the last 
section. 
I.  The Firm Pension Plan and Retirement Incentives 
The analysis in this paper is based on  salesmen  who are at  least 50 yeara 
old and have been  employed for at least three years.1  To understand the 
1The criterion that they be employed three years facilitates the 
forecasting of  future  wage earnings  on  an individual  basis.  We  plan in later 
work  to consider  other employee groups. (4) 
effect of the pension plan provisions,  consider several figures.  Figure 1 
shows the expected future  coapensation  of  a  person from our ssmple  who is 50 
years old and has been employed  by rhe  firm for 20 years.2  It is importsnt to 
consider total compensation--including  wage earnings,  the accrual of pension 
benefits, and the accrual  of  Social Security  benefits.  As  compensation for 
working another  year the employee receives salary  earnings.  He also receives 
compensation in the form of  future  pension  benefits.  The annual compensation 
in  this form is the change in the present  value of future pension  benefits, 
due to working an additional  year.  This accrual is comparable to wage 
earnings.  The accrual  of Social Security  benefits may also  be  calculated in a 
similar  manner, and is also comparable to wage earnings.  Figure  1 shows the 
present value at age 50 of expected future  compensation in all three forms. 
The line labelled  earnings represents cumulated  earnings, by  age of 
retirement.3  For example, if the person  were to retire  at age 62,  his 
cumulated earnings between age SO and age  62,  discounted to age 50 dollars 
would be  about $300,000.  The slope of  the  earnings  line represents annual 
earnings discounted to age 50 dollars.  Earnings decline rather slowly through 
age 60 and much more rapidly thereafter. 
The solid line shows the accrual of firm pension plus Social  Security 
benefits, again discounted to age 50 dollars.  The shape of  this profile is 
determined primarily by  the pension  plan provisions.  The most important 
2For convenience, the graphs  assume a 5 percent real discount rate and 
zero inflation.  In  the empirical model that is estimated, the  discount rate 
is estimated and the inflation  rate is assumed  to be S percent. 
3Departure from the firm  would be a more accurate description  than 
retirement,  because for some employees the alternative to continued employment  at  the firm is  likely  to be another job,  rather than retirement. —  (5) 
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provisions are described here.4  An  employee could leave the  fira at age 53, 
for example.  If  he  were to do that, and if  he  were vested in the firm's 
pension plan- 
-  which  occurs after 10 years of  service-  -he  would he entitled to 
normal retirement pension benefits at age 65,  based on his years of  service 
and current dollar earnings at  age 53.  He could start to receive benefits as 
early as age 55,  the penaion early retirement  age, but the benefit amount 
would be reduced actuarially.  If he started to receive benefits at age 55, 
they would be only 36 percent of  dollar amount  he would receive at  age 65. 
If,  however, he  were to remain in the firm until the early retirement age, the 
situation  would be quite different.  He would be entitled to normal retirement 
benefits based on his years of service and salary at age 55.  But,  if he were 
to start to receive them at  age 55,  the benefits would be  reduced less than 
actuarially, about 3 percent for each year that retirement precedes age 65, 
instead  of  6 or  7 percent.  In addition, the plan baa a Social Security offset 
provision.  Pension benefits are offset by  a specified amount,  depending on 
the firm estimate of  Social Security  benefits.  But if the person takes early 
retirement, between 55 and 65,  the Social  Security offset is not applied to 
benefits received before age 65.  These two provisions create the large 
discontinuous jump in retirement benefits at  age 55; there is an  enormous 
bonus for remaining with the firm until that age.  After age 55,  however, the 
person who does not retire foregoes the opportunity of taking  pension benefita 
on  very advantageous terms.  Thus the minimal change in  the discounted value 
of  benefits between 55 and 60.  If,  a person  has 30 years of aervice at age 
60, he  is entitled to full normal retirement benefits.  No  early retirement 
4full details of  the plan provisions are presented in Kotlikoff and Wise 
[1987]. (9) 
reduction is applied to benefits if they are taken then.  That is,  by 
continuing to work  he  will no  longer gain from fewer years of  early retirement 
reduction, as he did before age 60.  Thus the kink  in the profile and the 
decline thereafter. 
The top line shows total compensation.  The large jump at 55 reflects the 
early retirement provisions of  the pension plan.  Total compensation declines 
modestly each year through age 60 and very rapidly thereafter.  After age 62 
or 63,  total compensation is close to zero.  Under these circumstances, it 
would be  surprising if this person were to continue to work until age 65. 
The graph can also be  used to motivate the option value model used  in the 
subsequent analysis. Suppose that the person depicted in figure 1 is 
considering whether to retire now,  at age 50.  If he  does he  will receive 
utility indirectly from the retirement benefits that he  will receive until he 
dies.  (In fact,  he  will not be  able to receive firm pension benefits until 
age 55 and Social Security benefits can not be  taken until sge 62.)  If  he 
leaves the firm at age 50,  though,  he  foregoes the option of  retiring at some 
future age.  In this case, there will be a large increase in pension benefits 
at age 55,  and thus a jump in total lifetime income,  if he  postpones 
retirement until then,  Some later age may be even  more  advantageous.  In 
particular, if  he  does not retire,  he maintains the option of retiring at the 
future age that for him yields the highest expected utility.  The central 
feature of  the option value model is that the person will postpone retirement 
at  age 50 if,  based on  his expectations at age 50, the best  of the  future 
possibilities is better than retiring  now.  That  is he  postpones retirement if 
the value of  the  option to retire later exceeds the value of  retiring today. 
At each subsequent age,  he  will make the same comparison.  At  some age, future (10) 
retirement possibilities will look worse thsn immediate retirement and he will 
leave the firm. 
It is clear that the early retirement provisions in this firm are likely 
to have an  important effect on  retirement decisions.  The qualitative effect 
of  changing the early retirement age can be  seen by  comparing figures 1 and 2. 
Figure 2  describes the expectations of  the same person considered in  figure 1, 
except that the firm early retirement age  has been shifted from 55 to 60,  with 
all other plan provisions remaining unchanged.  It is apparent that the person 
would under these provisions be  much less likely  to retire before age 60. 
Estimates of  the actual effects of  such a  change are presented below. 
To calculate the amounts graphed in figures 1 and 2, future income is 
discounted at a 5 percent real interest  rate, and,  no distinction is made 
between individual valuation of  wage earnings versus pension benefits.  To 
predict retirement,  however, the relevant  values are not these,  but rather the 
discounted value of  future utilities based on  rhe weights that individuals 
assign to future income  streams in  determining  whether to retire.  Such values 
are estimated in  the subsequent analysis.  As it turns out, the estimated 
discount factor is much higher than 5 percent, and individuals  value a dollar 
of  retirement benefits much  more than a dollar of wage earnings; a dollar 
without work is better than a dollar with work.  Based on our parameter 
estimates, the graph, from the point of  view of  the individual, would look 
like figure 3 instead of  figure 1.  Based on  these valuations of  future income 
streams, the person depicted in figure 1  would be  much more likely to retire 
before age 60 say,  than is in  fact suggested  by  figure 1. 
Persons of  the same age face very different options depending on  years of 
service and earnings histories.  A comparison of  figures 1 and 4 demonstrates 
this point.  The person whose expected future  options are shown in figure 4 (11) 
has only three years of  service when he is 50 years old.  He  will not have 30 
years of service until he  is 77.  He  will not be  vested until he  is 57. 
Compared to the person in figure 1,  this person would apparently be much  less 
likely to retire  before age 65. 
Finally, consider a person who is still working at age 58 in 1980.  He 
has 18 years of service.  His expected future  options are shown in figure 5. 
Alrhough his wage earnings will decrease only slightly in  the next 10  years, 
the present value of  retirement benefits will decline almost continuously. 
The graph suggests that retirement would be  likely around 63 or 64.  It was 
clear from a comparison of  figures 1 and 2  that changing the firm early 
retirement age from 55 to 60 would have a substantial effect on  retirement. 
The potential effect of changes in  Social Security provisions can be seen by 
altering the options faced by  the person described in figure 5.  The current 
Social Security rules reduce benefits by 5/9 of  a percent for each month that 
benefits are taken before age 65.  Suppose that the reduction were 1 percent 
per month instead of  5/9.  The effect on  the options faced by the figure 5 
person are shown in figure 6.  The effect is noticeable, but not extreme.  The 
value of retirement benefits before age 65 has been shifted downward, and thus 
total income associated with retirement before age 65 has been  shifted down. 
The result would apparently be  a lower likelihood of  retirement between 62 and 
65,  judging by the change in the graph.  Actual estimates of  the effect of 
such a change in  Social Security provisions are presented below. 
II.  The OptiQn Value Model 
The details of the  option  value model are set forth in  this section. 
Antecedents for the model begin with Lazear and Moore  [1988] ,  who  argue  that (12) 
the option value of  postponing retirement is the appropriate variable to enter 
in  a regression equation explaining retirement.  Indeed, it was their work, 
and analysis of  military retirement rates by Phillips and Wise [1987],  that 
motivated us to pursue this approach.  Our model is also cloae in apirit to 
the much  more complicated  dynamic programming  model of  Rust  [1988] .  A  dynamic 
programming  model  of  employment behavior has also been proposed by  Berkovec 
and Stern [1988]. 
To begin, consider rhe  expected gain at age t from postponing retirement 
to age r.  We denote it by 
(1)  G(r) 
— EV(r) 
-  EtVt(t) 
where EV(r)  is the expected value from working through age r-l and retiring 
at age r,  and EtVt(t) is the expected value associated with  current 
retirement,  Suppose that r*  is the value of r that maximizes (1)  .  The  person 
postpones  retirement  at  age  t  if  Gt(r*)  > 0.  That is, 
(2)  Postpone retirement if Gt(r*) — EtVt(r*) 
-  EtVt(t) > 0 
If Ct(r*) < 0,  the person retires at age t.  Thus G(r) is the retirement 
decision function. 
The value function  V depends on  future earnings and on firm pension and 
Social Security benefits after retirement,  More precisely, V depends on  the 
indirect  utility from future  earnings and retirement benefits.  It is 
described by 
(3)  V(r) — XLfl5tUw(Ys)  + X_rfl5ttjr(.Bs(')) (13) 
If the person continues to work, his wage earnings in  year s  are given by  Y5 
and the  indirect utility from these earnings  by Uw(Ys)  The weight assigned 
to future utility, in the  determination of the retirement decision, is fi.  If 
he retires in year r, he will receive retirement benefits B5(r) in subsequent 
years s,  which he values according to the function Ur(Bs(r)).  As explained 
above,  a person's retireent  benefits will depend on  his age and years of 
service at the time  of retirement r,  as well as his earnings history: thus  the 
notation indicating that  is a function of  r.  (We adopt the  convention that 
if s is the first calendar year during  which the person has no wage earnings, 
he  is assumed to have retired at the age that he  was on  January 1 of  year s.) 
The two utility functions are specified as 
U(Y)  —  ÷ 
(4) 
Ur(B) 
— (kB5(r))7  + 
where  and  are individual-specific random effects.  The parameter k is to 
recognize the possibility that a dollar with  leisure - - while  retired  -  -  is 
better than a dollar that is only  had together with work.  The random terms 
reflect a variety of unobserved differences smong individuals.  The values 
thet individuals attach to wage and pension income  may differ.  Some persons 
may enjoy work more rhsn others: some may enjoy retirement more than others. 
Both may be  affected by  health status, for example.  Retirement decisions sre 
likely to be affected  by assets, other than pension wealth, which we  do not 
measure.  Such differences  will be  reflected in different values of  E.  In 
addition, we  consider retirement to be the alternative to continued employment (14) 
with the firm.  For some,  especially the younger persons in the sample  the 
alternative may well be another job.  The utility of  the alternative to work 
in such cases will presumably be  greater than the utility represented by 
Ur(Zs) for the typical person.  These differences too  will be  reflected in 
different values of  E.  (The heteroskedsstic error structure that the model 
implies, as explained below, is well suited  to capture the effects of 
alternatives other than retirement, with the likelihood of  such an alternative 
greatest for younger employees.) 
Differences in preferences for work versus retirement, differences in 
health status, and other individual differences are likely to persist.  Thus 
these terms are assumed to follow a random walk over tiae.  That is, 
us 
— w51 + 
,  E5_(ç,5) 
— 
(5) 
—  +  ,  E(€5) 
— 
We  adopt the convention that at  time a the individual  knows w  and  his 
future forecasts of  is  and e are based on (5).  The randoa walk  assumption 
means, for example, that if a  person's health status  worsens between periods t 
and t+l,  his expected health status in period t+2 is not what it was in period 
t, but rather what it was in  period t+l. 
With the substitution of  the specifications (3)  and (4),  G(r)  may be 
decomposed into two terms, one depending on  the individual-specific random 
terms 





(6)  + Et  + 
E VS  a5t  -  tLs_t 
— g(r) +  (r) 
where g(r) and t(r) distinguish the  random  effect terms from the other 
terms 
To evaluate these terms, it is necessary to account for the likelihood 
that a person will be  alive to collect  pension benefits, or to earn a  wage, in 
future  years.  If this probability is independent of  his earnings stream and 
the individual random effects, g(r) and t(r) become 
g(r) — 
(7)  +  _r5t5ItEtZs7] 
and 
(8)  (r) 
— 
where lr(slt) denotes the probability that the person will be  alive in  year a, 
given that he  is alive in  year t.  Civen the random walk assumption (5), (r) 
can be  written as (16) 
(9)  (r) 
— {yrl$s-t(slt)](we) 
- 
—  K(r)v 
where K(r) 
— $5t,r(s(t)  and  —  -  The aimplification 
results from the fact that at time t  the expected value of  —  - 
Ca  ia 
for all future yeara a;  thua the individual random component (r) depends 
only on  the random effect at time t.  The term K(r) cumulates the deflators 
that yield the present value in  year t of the future expected values of  the 
random components of utility.  The further r is in  the future, the larger is 
K(r).  That  is,  the more distant the potential retirement age,  the greater 
the uncertainty about it.  This yields a  heteroskedastic disturbance  term. 
In  short, C(r) may be  written simply as 
(10)  G(r) — g(r) +  Kt(r)vt 
The probability of retirement is easily described using this expression. 
If the person is to retire in  year  t, G(r) must be  less than zero for every 
potential retirement age r in the future.  If  rt is the r that yields the 
maximum value of g(r)/K(r), the probability of retirement becomes 
(11)  Pr[Retire in  year t] — Pr[g(rt)/K(rt)  < -"c] 
To  predict whether m person in the sample in year t-l retires in year t, 
equation (11)  is eli that is needed.  Finally, we assume that  is normally 
distributed with  variance 
a3.  The  parameters  to  be  estimated are  -y,  k,  r 
(where  fi 
—  l/(l+r)),  and as,. (17) 
In fact, we  are able to follow persons in  the sample for 5 consecutive 
years.  The analysis in this paper, however, is  based only on  data for one 
year.  Retirement probabilities for several  years may be derived as a simple 
extension of (11);  they are shown in  Stock and Wise [1988],  together with 
estimates based on  several consecutive  years for each person.5 
III.  Parametet Estimates and The Model Fit 
Evaluation of g(r)/K(r)  requires estimates of  future earnings. 
Individual earnings forecasts are based on a second order autoregression that 
recognizes individual differences in  earnings potential and accounts for past 
evidence of  earnings increases.  The autoregression was estimated using the 
individual earnings histories of  all salesmen employed at least three years, 
with earnings converted to 1980 dollars  using the Consumer Price Index.  The 
parameters of the forecasting  model depend on  age,  years of  service, and an 
interaction term.6 
The option value model parameter estimates and standard errors are:7 
k  oNtO5)  I 
1.00  1.66  0.847  0.119  -397.72 
(0.07)  (0.02)  (0.032)  (0.001) 
51n fact, the estimates based on  several years are very  close to those 
reported here.  Implementation using two or more consecutive years is only 
slightly more complicated than the exposition here, with 
115 
—  + €,  €5 
i.i.d. N(0,o), w  i.i.d. 5(0,02), where  and  s—tn  are 
independent.  The covsriance between  and 11T+l is var(v), and the  variance 
of  for r ￿  t is a  + (r-t)o6.  (See  Stock and Wise [1988].) 
6For more detail see Stock and Wise [1988]. 
7The estimates were obtained by  maximum likelihood, using 1500 
observations. (18) 
All of  the parameters are measured quite precisely, with the possible 
exception of the weight $.  The estimated y of 1 means that the value function 
V is linear in income.  This evidence rejects s log-linear value function, for 
example.  The estimated value of  k means that a dollar without work is worth 
1.66  times a dollar gotten by  working.  In other words, the typical person 
would be willing to exchange a dollar with work for 60 ceots without work. 
This suggests, loosely interpreted, that retirement benefits that replaced 60 
percent of  wage earnings would make a person indifferent  between work and 
retirement.  In  the retirement decision,  the estimated weight given to income 
one yemr in  the future  versus now is  .847;  income  five years hence is given 
about half as  much weight ma income today.  The variance term 
a1,,  $11,900, 
should be  interpreted relative to the present value of  future income.  Typical 
values are indicated by  the graphs at the  beginning of  the paper. 
The model fits the data very well.  First,  consider three likelihood 
valuea: 
Prediction Method  £ 
Using the sample average retirement probability  -579.6 
Using average probability for  each age  -477.9 
Using the model estimates  -397.7 
Comparison of  the aecond and third values shows that retirement probabilities 
based on  the model fit the data much  better than predictions that would be 
obtained by  using a dummy variable for each age.  One might assume that using 
the sample average retirement rate for each age would provide very good 
predictiona.  But what the comparison reflects ia that retirement 
probabilities vary a great deal among peraons of  the same age.  That this was 
likely to be  true was evident from the graphs at  the beginning of  the paper. (19) 
In addition, the probabilities for any age group depend strongly on  discounted 
future income streams, as cumulated in  the model.  Thus the model with  only 
four parameters performs better than a  model with  17 age dummy variables that 
ignores differences in  expected future income streams among persons of  the 
same age.  Unlike other models of  retirement,  age enters the option value 
model only indirectly --  through  the survival probabilities, the earnings 
forecasts, and the firm pension plan and Social Security rules. 
Another way to understand the model fit is to compare actual versus 
predicted retirement rates.  These are shown in table 1 and in figure 7. 
There are large jumps in  the actual retirement rates at specific ages:  55, 
60,  and 62.  All are matched very closely  by the model predictions.  Both the 
actual and predicted rates are 8  percent at age 55.  One is 22,  the other 19 
at age 60.  One is 46,  the other 65 at age 62.  Beyond age 64  the sample sizes 
are too small to make reliable comparisons.  The proportion of those in  the 
firm at age SO that would remain at age 54,  based on actual retirement rates, 
is  .14;  the predicted proportion is  .12.  This suggests that even though 
measured variables may often not evaluate correctly the alternative to 
continued work  in the firm for younger employees, the error specification 
allows enough flexibility that the model predictions are still quite accurate. 
At  older ages, the model predicts almost precisely the proportion of  employees 
who have left the firm,  as shown in  figure  7. 
We have also used the model to predict retirement rates in  1981 for 
persons in the sample who did not retire in 1980,  The results are shown in 
table  2.  The interesting feature of this comperison is that retirement rates 
at  59,  60,  and 61 were considerably higher in  1981 then in 1980.  Nonetheless, 
the model matches the actual rates very closely.  Presumably the dliferent 
retirement rates were  due to different predictions about future earnings in (20) 
Table I 




Retirement Rates  Cumulative  Rates 
Actual  Predicted  Actual  Predicted 
50.000  36.000  0.000  0.025  0.000  0.025 
51.000  131.000  0.053  0.037  0.053  0.061 
52.000  132.000  0.015  0.026  0.068  0.086 
53.000  123.000  0.041  0.024  0.106  0.108 
54.000  106.000  0.038  0.009  0.139  0.116 
55.000  129.000  0.078  0.075  0.206  0.182 
56.000  137.000  0.117  0.073  0.299  0.241 
57.000  123.000  0.089  0.108  0.362  0.323 
58.000  107.000  0.084  0.102  0.415  0.392 
59.000  120.000  0.125  0.149  0.488  0.483 
60.000  116.000  0.216  0.194  0.599  0.583 
61.000  84.000  0.190  0.233  0.675  0.680 
62.000  70.000  0.457  0.447  0.824  0.823 
63.000  51.000  0.412  0.503  0.896  0.912 
64.000  22.000  0.455  0.491  0.943  0.955 
65.000  14.000  0.857  0.468  0.992  0.976 
66.000  1.000  0.000  0.355  0.992  0.985 
aThe retirement rates  were computed for the 1500 persons used to 





















































































































































































Out-of-Sample  Predictions  for 1981 
Number of 
Ae  Observations 
Retirement  Rates  Cumulative  Rates 
Actual  Predicted  Actual  Predicted 
50.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
51.000  36.000  0.056  0.033  0.056  0.033 
52.000  124.000  0.040  0.033  0.094  0.065 
53.000  130.000  0.046  0.021  0.135  0.085 
54.000  118.000  0.042  0.014  0.172  0.098 
55.000  102.000  0.088  0.079  0.245  0.168 
56.000  119.000  0.126  0.115  0.340  0.264 
57.000  121.000  0,074  0.101  0.389  0.338 
58.000  112.000  0.107  0.147  0.455  0.435 
59.000  98.000  0.173  0.165  0.549  0.528 
60.000  105.000  0.276  0.293  0.674  0.667 
61.000  91.000  0.231  0.244  0.749  0.748 
62.000  68.000  0.471  0.504  0.867  0.875 
63.000  38.000  0.447  0.447  0.927  0.931 
64.000  30.000  0.367  0.540  0.954  0.968 
65.000  12.000  0.833  0.531  0.992  0,985 
66.000  2.000  0.000  0.200  0.992  0.988 
67.000  1.000  0.000  0.297  0.992  0.992 (23) 
the  firm that the model captures, or to differences in the distribution of 
employees by  age and years of  service,  that also enter the model calculations. 
From the earnings regression, it is evident that future earnings prospects 
changed significantly from one year to the next.  The model underestimates a 
bit the departure racss of persons under 55.  Again, the model predictions are 
much better than predictions  based on  age-specific retirement  rates,  as shown 
by  the following likelihood values: 
Predjction Method 
Using the sample average  retirement probability  -559.3 
Using average probability  for each age  -473.9 
Using the model estimates  -404.4 
IV.  Simulations of the Effects  of  Changes in Pension and SS Provisions 
We  have used the model to simulate the effect of  several potential 
changes in the firm pension plan and in  Social Security provisions.  We 
conclude that potential changes in the firm pension plan have a  much greater 
effect on  retirement rates than changes in Social Security rules.  Four 
changes are considered: 
A.  Increase the Firm Early Retirement Are from 55 to 60 
The effect of increasing the firm's early retirement age from 55 to 60, 
leaving other provisions as they were, is shown in  table 3,  and is graphed in 
figure 8.  Under the current plan 48 percent of those employed at 50 have left 
by  59.  only 30 percent would have left by  age 59 if early retirement had been 
at 60 instead of  55.  Only 11.5 percent of  employees leave between 55 and 59 
if early retirement is at  60,  whereas 36.7 peccant leave between these ages 
under the current system.  On the other hand,  because the early retirement (24) 
Table 3 
Simulation:  Increase the Firm Early Retirement Age 
From 55 to 60 
Age 
Retirement Rates  Cumulative  Rates 
Base  Simulation Difference  Base  Simulation  Difference 
50.000  0.025  0.032  0.007  0.025  0.032  0.007 
51.000  0.037  0.047  0.011  0.061  0.078  0.017 
52.000  0.026  0.041  0.015  0.086  0.116  0.030 
53.000  0.024  0.041  0.017  0.108  0.153  0.045 
54.000  0.009  0.038  0.029  0.116  0.185  0.069 
55.000  0.075  0.041  -0.033  0.182  0.219  0.037 
56.000  0.073  0.034  -0.038  0.241  0.245  0.004 
57.000  0.108  0.036  -0.072  0.323  0.272  -0.051 
58.000  0.102  0.023  -0.079  0.392  0.289  -0.103 
59.000  0.149  0.015  -0.133  0.483  0.300  -0.182 
60.000  0.194  0.194  0.000  0.583  0.436  -0.147 
61.000  0.233  0.233  0.000  0.680  0.568  -0.113 
62.000  0.447  0.447  0.000  0.823  0.761  -0.062 
63.000  0.503  0.503  0.000  0.912  0.881  -0.031 
64.000  0.491  0.491  0.000  0.955  0.939  -0.016 
65.000  0.468  0.468  0.000  0.976  0.968  -0.008 



















































































































































































































































"bonus" is now farther in the future, more employees leave the firm between 50 
and 54.  This is the result of the greater weight given to current versus 
future income.  In short,  many more workers would be  employed between the ages 
of  37 and 65 if the early retirement age were 60 instead of 33. 
B.  Increase the SS Early Retirement Reduction Factor 
The current Social Security rules include  s benefit reduction of 5/9 
percent per month of  retirement before age 65.  We consider the effect of 
increasing the reduction factor to 1 percent per month.  The results are shown 
in  table 4 and graphically in figure 9.  It is clear that the effect of this 
change is small relative to the effect of the change in the firm early 
retirement age.  This is primarily because only a small fraction of firm 
employees are still working at age 62, only 18 percent in the base case.  The 
retirement rates of  those still employed at age 62,  however, are considerably 
lower -- about  21 percent - -  with the higher reduction factor.  They are also 
lower at 63.  Still,  the net result on  the employment of persons covered by 
the firm's pension plan is negligible. 
C.  Increase the SS Retirement Area by  One Year 
Current plans are to increase the Social Security retirement age from 65 
to 67 by  2027.  To  judge the effect of much a change on  workers with pension 
plans like the one in  our firm, we simulate the effect of increasing the 
normal retirement age from 63 to 66 and the early retirement age from 62 to 
63.  The results are in table S and in figure 10.  Again, the effect on the 
retirement rates of  persona in our firm is small.  This is true even though 
the effect on  the annual retirement rates of 62 and 65 year oldm is 
substantial.  The retirement rate of  62-year-oids is reduced from  44.7 to 33.2 (27) 
Table 4 
Simulation: Increase  of Social Security Early  Retirement 
Reduction Factor 
Ae 
Retirement  Rates  Cunr.ilative  Rates 
Base  Simulation  Difference  Base  Simulation Difference 
50.000  0.025  0.026  0.000  0.025  0.026  0.000 
51.000  0.037  0.037  0.000  0.061  0.062  0.001 
52.000  0.026  0.026  0.000  0.086  0.086  0.001 
53.000  0.024  0.024  0.000  0.108  0.109  0.001 
54.000  0.009  0.010  0.000  0.116  0.11]  0.001 
55.000  0.075  0.075  0.001  0.182  0.184  0.002 
56.000  0.073  0.074  0.001  0.241  0.244  0.003 
57.000  0.108  0.108  0.000  0.323  0.326  0.003 
58.000  0.102  0.102  0.000  0.392  0.395  0.003 
59.000  0.149  0.149  0.001  0.483  0.485  0.003 
60.000  0.194  0.195  0.001  0.583  0.586  0.003 
61.000  0.233  0.235  0.001  0.680  0.683  0.003 
62.000  0.447  0.354  -0.092  0.823  0.795  -0.028 
63.000  0.503  0.437  -0.066  0.912  0.885  -0.027 
64.000  0.491  0.466  -0.025  0.955  0.938  -0.017 
65.000  0.468  0.468  0.000  0.976  0.967  -0.009 





























































































































































































Simulation:  Increaae the Social Security Retirement 
Age by One Year 
Age 
Retirement  Rates  Cumulative Rates 
Base  Simulation  Difference  Base  Simulation Difference 
50.000  0.025  0.026  0.000  0.025  0.026  0.000 
51.000  0.037  0.037  0.000  0.06].  0.062  0.001 
52.000  0.026  0.026  0.000  0.086  0.086  0.001 
53.000  0.024  0.024  0.000  0.108  0.109  0.001 
54.000  0.009  0.010  0.000  0.116  0.117  0.001 
55.000  0.075  0.075  0.001  0.182  0.184  0.002 
56.000  0.073  0.074  0.001  0.241  0.244  0.002 
57.000  0.108  0.108  0.000  0.323  0.326  0.002 
58.000  0.102  0.102  0.000  0.392  0.395  0.002 
59.000  0.149  0.149  0.001  0.483  0.485  0.002 
60.000  0.194  0.195  0.001  0.583  0.585  0.002 
61.000  0.233  0.235  0.001  0.680  0.683  0.002 
62.000  0.447  0.332  -0.115  0.823  0.788  -0.035 
63.000  0.503  0.483  -0.020  0.912  0.890  -0.022 
64.000  0.491  0.462  -0.029  0.955  0.941  -0.014 
65.000  0.468  0.402  -0.067  0.976  0.965  -0.011 


















































































































































































percent.  The rate at  65 is reduced from 46.8 to 40.2.  But only a few workera 
remain in  the firm to be affected by these changes. 
0.  Increase SS Retirement Ages by  One Year  and Start the SS Offset at  66 
If the Social Security retirement age were increased to 66,  the firm 
might be  expected to begin  the Social Security offset at 66 instead of 65. 
Thus we  have simulated che effect of increasing the Social Security retirement 
ages by  one year g4  beginning  the Social Security offset to the firm pension 
benefits at 66 instead of 65.  The result is reported in  table 6 and ahown 
graphically in  figure 11.  Increasing the Social Security retirement ages 
reduced retireaent rates by  a small amount, as shown in  table 5.  But even 
these small effects would essentially be counteracted if  the firm were to 
respond by  delaying the imposition of  the Social Security offset.  For 
example, increasing the Social Security retirement ages reduced the retirement 
rate at age 62 by .115;  the reduction is only .030  if the Social Security 
action  is accompanied by  the firm response that we have  simulated. 
IV.  Summary and Concluding Comments 
The option value model developed in Stock and Wise [1988]  has been used 
to  simulate the effects on  retirement of  changes in  a firm's pension plan  and 
of  changes in  Social Security rules.  Several important conclusions are 
supported by the analysis: 
•  The provisions of  the firm's pension plan  have a much greater 
effect than  Social Security regulations on  the retirement 
decisions of  the firm's employees. 
•  Increasing the firm's early retirement age from 55 to 60,  for 
example, would reduce by  almost 40 percent, from .48  to  .30,  the 
fraction of  employees that is retired by  age 60. (32) 
Table 6 
Simulation: Increase Social Security Retirement Ages by One Year  4  Start  the Social Security Offset at 66 
Age 
Retirement Rates  Cumulative Rates 
Base  Simulation Difference  Base  Simulation Difference 
50.000  0.025  0.026  0.000  0.025  0.026  0.000 
51.000  0.037  0.037  0.001  0.061  0.062  0001 
52.000  0.026  0.027  0.001  0.086  0.087  0.002 
53.000  0.024  0.025  0.001  0.108  0.110  0.003 
54.000  0.009  0.010  0.000  0.116  0.119  0.003 
55.000  0.075  0.078  0.003  0.182  0.187  0.006 
56.000  0.073  0.077  0.004  0.241  0.250  0.009 
57.000  0.108  0.108  0.000  0.323  0.331  0.008 
58.000  0.102  0.102  -0.000  0.392  0.399  0.007 
59.000  0.149  0.148  -0.001  0.483  0.488  0.006 
60.000  0.194  0.195  0.000  0.583  0.588  0.005 
61.000  0.233  0.234  0.000  0.680  0.684  0.004 
62.000  0.447  0.417  -0.030  0.823  0.816  -0.007 
63.000  0.503  0.497  -0.006  0.912  0.907  -0.005 
64.000  0.491  0.451  -0.040  0.955  0.949  -0.006 
65.000  0.468  0.450  -0.019  0.976  0.972  -0.004 



































































































































































































































































•  The effect of changes in Social Security rules,  on the  other hand, 
would be  small.  Raising the Social Security retirement ages by 
one year, for example, has very little effect on employee 
retirement rates.  The proportion retired by  age 62 is reduced by 
only about 4 percent. 
•  Changes in Social Security provisiona that would otherwise 
encourage workers to continue working can easily be offset by 
countervailing changes in the  provisions of the firm's pension 
plan.  Firm responses, like delaying the Social Security offset to 
correspond to a later Social Security retirement age,  may siaply 
be  a logical revision of current firm plan provisioos. 
Thus in considering the effect of changes in Social Security rules,  like the 
retirement age,  it is important to understsnd the implications of private 
pension plan provisions.  In particular, if  rhe effect on retirement decisions 
of  changes in Social Security rules is to be  predicted the potential response 
of  firms to the changes cannot be ignored. 
Although the analysis is based on  the retirement experience in a single 
large firm,  the firm's pension plan is typical of defined benefit plans. 
Approximately 75 percent of the employees  who are covered by  a firm pension 
have defined benefit plans.  Thus the results suggest that pension plans in 
general have had a very  substantial  effect on  the labor force participation 
rates of older workers. 
In addition to the simulations, the paper describes the option value 
model of retirement.  Comparisons of actual versus predicted retirement rates 
demonstrate that the model predicts very complicated retirement patterns with 
considerable precision.  That the model fits observed data well increases our 
confidence in the simulated results. (35) 
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